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Abstract
The democratization of science entails the public having greater influence
over science and that influence being shared more equally among members
of the public. This chapter will present a thumbnail sketch of the arguments
for the democratization of science based on the importance of collectively
shaping science’s impact on society, the instrumental benefits of public par-
ticipation in science, and the need to ensure that the use of science in politics
does not undermine collective self-government. It will then outline worries
about citizen competence, the abuse of democratic ideals and the limits posed
by the nation-state.
1 Introduction
The standard account of the relationship between science and democracy that was
dominant in liberal democracies in the postwar period can be summarized, with
some idealization, as follows. Science is a public good that provides various benefits
to society. It improves the public’s health, increases economic productivity, and
contributes to national defense. It helps to produce effective policies. For these
reasons, science should be financially supported by the public. But it should be
self-governing. Outsiders cannot predict which research will promote the growth of
science or produce social benefits. Their interventions will inevitably distort science
(Bush, 1945; Merton, 1938; Polanyi, 1962).
The standard account insists on a strict division of labor between the public and
scientists. The public, through the democratic process, sets social ends. Scientists
then, inform the public about how to pursue those ends and the outcomes of differ-
ent courses of action. Questions of ends and values belong to the public; questions
of means and facts belong to the scientists (Weber, 1949).
*I thank Gülru Göker, Gürol Irzık, Zeynep Pamuk and the editors of this volume for helpful
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this chapter. This work was supported by the BAGEP
Award of the Science Academy.
†Sabancı University
1
This neat division of labor envisaged by the standard account relies on two as-
sumptions. First, science is a value-free enterprise. While cognitive values do play
a role in science and ethical values impose certain limits, the context of justification
is free of ethical and social values. Second, the public can reason about the ends
it wishes to pursue independently of knowledge provided by science. According to
the standard account, the choices that scientists have the authority to make do not
influence the setting of public ends. They play a role only in the process of deciding
how to pursue them. Both of these assumptions have been challenged by theory
and experience. As a result, “an autonomous and authoritative science” has come
to appear “intolerable” (Douglas, 2009, p. 7, emphasis in original). One response
to this state of affairs has been a call for the democratization of science.
2 What is Democratization of Science?
The democratization of science sometimes refers to the redistribution of epistemic
authority between scientists and laypeople to make it more equal. In this sense, it
encompasses efforts to “democratize expertise” that erode the boundaries between
scientists and laypeople by recognizing various forms of “lay expertise” (Collins and
Evans, 2002; Solomon, 2009). While political and epistemic considerations cannot
be fully separated, there is also a political sense of democratization. In the latter
sense, the democratization of science is the widening of the scope of democratic
control to include various decisions about science. This chapter is about this second
sense of democratization.
A domain of social life is democratically governed when all relevant parties
enjoy equal opportunity to influence it in light of an accurate conception of their
preferences, interests, and values (Kolodny, 2014, p. 289; Pettit, 2012, pp. 21–22).
Accordingly, democratization of science refers to (a) the increase of the public’s
influence over various aspects of science; and (b) the equalization of the opportunity
for influence among members of the public; coupled with (c) the realization of the
conditions that enable of members of the public to form an accurate conception of
their interests and values, and gain knowledge of what will promote them.
Since its different dimensions come in degrees, the democratization of science
is not an all or nothing matter. This has two implications worth noting. First, when
pursuing the democratization of science, we need to pay attention to the trade-offs
and interactions between its different dimensions. Second, calls for democrati-
zation of science can demand not full but partial democratization, and do so on
principled grounds.
This definition does not identify democracy with a specific decision procedure
or an institution. Rather, it identifies a set conditions that may be realized by dif-
ferent institutional arrangements and practices, which are to be evaluated in terms
of how well they realize democratic rule (Pettit, 2012, p. 180; see also Dewey, 2012,
pp. 120–1). In contemporary societies, the democratization of science will make
use of both mechanisms of direct participation, such as citizen juries, consensus
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conferences and deliberative polls, and representative institutions.1 Given that the
public has limited resources, it can increase its influence over outcomes by delegat-
ing some decisions to other agents (Plotke, 1997). Provided the public gets to de-
cide which decisions fall into which category, who it delegates decisions to, and re-
tains control over its agents, this does not diminish democracy since such measures
increase its influence. Descriptive representation can also supplement traditional
forms of publicly authorized and accountable representation. As the community of
scientists begin to include members of excluded groups and come to resemble the
society at large, this will also contribute to the democratization of science, because
their choices will, to some extent, reflect the perspectives of social groups they come
from.
In addition to combining direct and representative forms of decision-making,
the public deliberation and influence required by the democratization of science will
take place in many different sites (Habermas, 1996, pp. 187–280; Mansbridge et al.,
2012; Pettit, 2012, pp. 187–280). The crucial insight of the proponents of the sys-
temic approach to deliberative democracy applies to the democratization of science
as well: it is the joint operation of various associations and institutions–“including
informal networks, the media, organized advocacy groups, schools, foundations,
private and non-profit institutions, legislatures, executive agencies, and the courts”–
as a whole that will realize the democratization of science (Mansbridge et al., 2012,
p. 2; see also Moore, 2017).
Calls for the democratization of science are sometimes ridiculed for demanding
absurdities such as voting on the truth or falsity of scientific hypotheses. But, as
we’ve seen, democracy is not just counting heads. And, it is not the acceptance
or rejection of hypotheses that the proponents of the democratization of science
want to address. It is, rather, decisions about the production, dissemination and
application of science (Kitcher, 2001, 2011).
In the production of scientific knowledge, there are decisions regarding the set-
ting of research priorities and the allocation of resources; decisions about the epis-
temic and practical goals that shape the design of experiments or studies, the op-
erationalization of variables and the setting of evidentiary standards; more broadly,
there is the question of how much critical scrutiny and evidence is necessary be-
fore a scientific finding becomes the basis of public action. There are also decisions
regarding the dissemination of research. Should there be journals devoted to pub-
lishing negative results? Should the gender analysis of data be mandatory in medical
journals? Should scientific publishing be open access? Finally, there are decisions
in the application of scientific research in a specific context. Of the many candidate
policies or technologies to achieve a given end, which one should be employed?
Which local conditions should be paid particular attention to?
1For a survey of direct public participation in science see (Bucchi and Neresini, 2008). For a study
of the role of representation in the democratization of science, see (Brown, 2009).
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3 Why Democratize Science?
3.1 The argument from impact and instrumental benefits
The principle that all affected by a decision should have a say in it, provides one
reason for democratizing science. Science and the technologies based on it can
cause immense benefits and harms. They have a deep and often unavoidable impact
on the lives not just of scientists but of everyone. Scientists, by themselves, cannot
take into account all these interests that their activities will affect. It is only if
people can influence science that they can protect and promote their interests. Thus,
everyone who is affected by science should have a say in its governance—especially
when it is publicly funded or when it can harm people’s weighty interests (Kitcher,
2001, 2011).
The democratization of science also improves the application of scientific re-
search by making better use of knowledge dispersed across society. It does this,
first, by facilitating discussions that help identify and articulate public needs. Sec-
ond, it takes better advantage of the epistemic diversity in the people and their
local knowledge compared to top-down approaches (Anderson, 2006; Callon et
al., 2009, pp. 89–94; Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993; Wynne, 1992). Evidence for
the effectiveness of a policy or technology will come from a specific context: its
efficacy elsewhere is an open question that hinges on local conditions (Cartwright
and Hardie, 2012). The people who will use a technology or scientific finding will
have this knowledge. It will be farm workers who will use a pesticide every day,
for instance, who know if the precautions sufficient for its safe use in lab condi-
tions can be reproduced in the field (Irwin, 1995, pp. 17–21). Public participation
in research, in particular the participation of marginalized groups, can also provide
“transformative criticism” of epistemic goals and practices. It can encourage sci-
entists to consider alternative research paradigms and shape research in ways that
will better serve the public (Longino, 2004, pp. 134–5; Wylie, 2015; Brown et al.,
2006).
The public can fully benefit from science and follow science-based policies only
if it trusts scientists. Democratization can help build well-placed trust. Mini-
publics enable a small number of citizens, who are demographically representative
of the larger population, to interact with scientists and deliberate about technically
complex issues. These mini-publics can act as “trusted information proxies” and
offer members of the public scientific information they can trust (MacKenzie and
Warren, 2012). In controversial cases, they can help the public find out whether the
disagreement between them and scientists is due to conflicting interests or different
levels of knowledge (Keren, 2015, p. 1293).
Democratic influence over scientific decisions can also make science more trust-
worthy for the public. When the public and scientists disagree about the badness
of the consequences of different kinds of error in research, they cannot fully trust
scientists (Irzik and Kurtulmus, 2019). Democratic deliberation can lead to revi-
sions and alignments in these value judgments. It can thereby provide the basis for
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enhanced forms of trust. Many sciences have been complicit in the domination of
certain social groups and have neglected their interests–as has been the case, for
instance, with medical science and African Americans, women, and LGBTI indi-
viduals. Ensuring that these groups have a voice in the governance of science can
help build trust between them and scientists (Scheman, 2001; Grasswick, 2010;
Koskinen and Rolin, 2019).
3.2 The argument from collective self-government
As previously noted, the standard account assumes that science can and ought to
be free of social and ethical value judgements. This vision has been criticized by
philosophy of science, putting pressure on the vision of autonomous science in the
standard account by suggesting that an autonomous science can become an unac-
countable source of power that undermines collective self-government. The well-
established observation that no amount of evidence, by itself, entails a hypothesis,
prompts two influential critiques of the value-free ideal of science: Longino’s argu-
ment from underdetermination and Douglas’s argument from inductive risk.
Longino has argued that some fact is evidence for a hypothesis only in virtue
of background beliefs which are essential for evidential reasoning (Longino, 1990,
pp. 40–55). These beliefs embody ideologies and social values: thus, values cannot
be excluded from scientific inquiry (Longino, 1990, p. 216). Douglas’s critique is
based on the existence of inductive risk (2009; see also Lacey chapter 13). Since
no evidence entails a hypothesis, there is always the risk of error in its acceptance
or rejection: one can mistakenly accept a false hypothesis or reject one that is true.
Usually, these risks cannot be minimized simultaneously. Thus, when setting stan-
dards for accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, value judgments regarding the badness
of these two kinds of errors come into the picture. Douglas restricts her argument
to “the choice of methods” and “the characterization and interpretation of data”
(2009, p. 112). Biddle and Kukla (2017), however, point out that all stages of in-
quiry, not just the inference from evidence to hypothesis, are riddled with risks of
error and value-laden choices. The operationalization of concepts, the inclusion or
exclusion of borderline data points, and the choice of models involve risks of error
and invite value judgements too.
If science provides crucial input for policy and if values play an ineliminable
role in scientific inquiry, then scientists, whose work is not informed by the val-
ues of the public, can encroach the public’s powers. Suppose, for instance, that the
public intends to shut down a factory if the chemicals it releases into the air harm
public health. They consult scientists to determine whether this is the case. Now,
suppose that these scientists use a very high evidentiary standard for accepting and
asserting that the chemicals are harmful. This would make it unlikely that the fac-
tory would be shut down. The scientists who adopt this evidentiary standard, or
other actors who can influence their decisions, would be exercising political power
that is not rightfully theirs. They would, thereby, be undermining the public’s right
to collective self-government. Such encroachments can be avoided by democratiz-
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ing science and ensuring that the public’s values figure in these decisions (Douglas,
2005; Elliott, 2011; Pamuk, n.d.).
The argument from collective self-government does not stand or fall with the
critique of the value-free ideal. The proponents of the value-free ideal concede that
values play a role when choosing research topics (Weber, 1949, pp. 21–2, 72–3).
Those choices can also shape political decisions, because political decisions are sen-
sitive to the existing policy options and what is known about them. If scientists
develop certain policy options and neglect others or study the costs of some poli-
cies while ignoring the costs of others, their research can shape political decisions
(Lacey, 1999; Sarewitz, 2010). For instance, scientists may concentrate their re-
search efforts on preventing cancer or treating it. When studying its causes, they
may focus on individual behavioral or environmental and social factors. The choices
they make at each step can shape the health policies a society will adopt.
What the public knows, thanks to science, also shapes the ends it seeks to pur-
sue. The public can seek to avoid risks only if it knows of their existence. It can
only pursue goals that it thinks are possible. If existing research or the research that
reaches the public suggests that there is uncertainty about the existence of a prob-
lem or the possibility of solving it, then this can effectively preserve the status quo.
Very often, a social problem becomes a public concern only when scientists validate
it (Weingart, 1999, p. 155). In all of these cases, scientists or powerful actors who
can influence their research will enjoy substantial agenda-setting power: they will
be determining what becomes an issue to be addressed politically and which options
the public can choose from (Pamuk, 2019, pp. 11–2).
The choices that shape scientific research may be unintentional. They may be
due to disciplinary biases or the demographic makeup of researchers. They may also
be the intentional outcome of the interests of scientists or those who fund them
(Fernández Pinto chapter 14). The tobacco industry, for instance, has selectively
produced and shared research in order to create uncertainty about the harms of
tobacco (Oreskes and Conway, 2011). This has helped them forestall public policy
harmful to their interests. Recent studies of how this strategy works suggest that the
problem is not necessarily biased research (Holman and Bruner, 2017; Weatherall et
al., n.d.). Individual researchers may be impeccable, but the overall body of research
that is produced and is filtered to the public and policy makers can create bias. If it is
the total body of research that shapes political decisions, then democratic control of
only the use of scientific research as an input to policy making is not enough: control
should come at earlier stages—for instance, in the setting of research agendas. Both
science for policy and policy for science should be subject to democratic control.2
4 Worries and Challenges
The major worry about the democratization of science concerns citizens’ compe-
tence. If citizens’ uninformed views shape science, then “projects with epistemic
2I am grateful to Zeynep Pamuk for suggesting this formulation.
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significance would often be dismissed, perceptions of short-term benefits would
dominate, and resources would be likely to be channeled toward a few ‘hot topics”’
(Kitcher, 2001, p. 117). In the application of science, it would be the arguments of
demagogues rather than the best science that shapes decisions.
Worries about public competence should figure in all efforts to democratize
science. But they do not justify outright rejection: case studies have documented
how members of the public can achieve competence in scientific understanding.
AIDS patients and activists have influenced AIDS research for the better (Epstein,
1996); the residents of Woburn, Massachusetts have discovered a leukemia cluster
in their area and traced it to its cause (Brown and Mikkelsen, 1990); parents of chil-
dren with spinal muscular atrophy have collected clinical data on the disease and set
up a research institute (Callon et al., 2009); and many social movements have re-
shaped scientific research agenda by drawing attention to “undone science” (Frickel
et al., 2010). Although exceptional cases of stakeholders influencing research, they
demonstrate that ordinary citizens can acquire the relevant knowledge and skills–
and also utilize their personal and local knowledge–to improve scientific research
and practice, when engaged. They remind us that competence is not a given, but
can change. Thus, efforts to democratize science should be coupled with efforts
to increase citizen competence. Kitcher’s proposal for deliberative polls, where sci-
entists tutor a representative sample of citizens and citizens deliberate about the
governance and application of science is one institutional innovation that can serve
this goal (Kitcher, 2011).
The account of democratization offered in this chapter incorporates representa-
tive mechanisms. In some instances, the competence required of citizens will only
be the ability to identify those who will successfully act on their behalf. Finally,
since values play a crucial role in science, scientific competence is not the only com-
petence that matters. The ability to articulate and to take into account different
social interests and to deliberate about the common good also matters. Decision-
making bodies that include citizens are likely to do better in this dimension than
those that exclude them.
A second worry is that efforts to democratize science are open to abuse. In a
democratic society, having citizens support your favored policy matters. As many
corporations have realized, having citizens who appear to support your policy is a
second-best. Thus, the hijacking of public participation in science by other actors
is a persistent danger (Wilholt, 2014, p. 171). For instance, many patient advocacy
groups receive industry funding that they don’t disclose (Fabbri et al., 2020). Phar-
maceutical companies use efforts to take into account the diverse medical needs of
different social groups to extend patents (Fernández Pinto, 2018). Corporations
set up astroturf groups that pretend to be grassroots organizations. These organiza-
tions create the appearance of public support for positions friendly to corporations
and misinform the public (Otto, 2016, pp. 292–3). The danger of abuse, however,
exists for any public ideal since rogue actors will have an incentive to hide their
actions behind them. It is not a reason for rejecting the ideal, but a reminder that
when designing mechanisms for public participation in science we should address
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this risk.
Finally, despite all the changes brought on by decades of globalization, contem-
porary democracy operates at the level of the nation-state. Science, however, is a
global enterprise. Even though much of it is done in affluent parts of the world, it
affects the entire world population. Therefore, the argument from impact suggests
a global extension of the democratization of science (Kitcher, 2011, pp. 117–8).
Science produced in the affluent parts of the world also figures in policy making in
the rest of the world through the transfer of research among scientists and through
international organizations like the World Bank, the IMF, and the WHO. Thus,
the argument from collective self-government also reaches beyond the nation-state.
How to carry out such an extension in practice remains a challenge for the democ-
ratization of science.
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